Read the book “The Ugly American” by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick. As you read the book take note of vignettes that positively relate to the following principles in the attached file. Not all principles listed in the attached document must be applied. Seeking at least three positive vignettes from the book that correlate with the attached principles document.
Aside from the book, “The Ugly American”, no other sources or references are required. Please refrain from unnecessary quotes from the book.
The purpose of this essay is NOT a book report. Please do not provide a summary of the book.
MUST write in the active voice (avoid passive voice)
* Understand the Operational Environment. Special operations cannot shape the operational environment without first gaining a clear understanding of the theater of operations, to include civilian influence and enemy and friendly capabilities. SOF achieve objectives by understanding the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables within the specific operational environment and by developing plans to act within the realities of those operational environments. ARSOF must identify the friendly and hostile decision makers, their objectives and strategies, and the ways in which they interact. The conditions of conflict can change, and ARSOF must anticipate these changes in the operational environment and exploit fleeting opportunities.
* Recognize Political Implications. Many special operations are conducted to advance critical political objectives. ARSOF must understand that their actions can have international consequences. Whether conducting operations independently or in coordination with partners, SOF must consider the political effects of their actions. SOF must anticipate ambiguous operational environments in which military factors are not the only concern. Special operations frequently create conditions for nonmilitary activities to occur within indigenous populations and for civil institutions to achieve U.S. and HN objectives. Consequently, the advancement of political objectives may take precedence over the achievement of military priorities.
* Facilitate Interagency Activities. Most special operations occur in an interagency environment where the U.S. Government departments and agencies are supporting common national objectives as part of a country team effort. ARSOF must actively and continuously coordinate their activities with all relevant parties—U.S. and foreign military and nonmilitary organizations—to ensure efficient use of all available resources and maintain unity of effort.
Engage the Threat Discriminately. Special operations missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ ARSOF. Special operations may be applied with precision and accuracy to minimize collateral effects and in a concealed or clandestine manner (or through the actions of indigenous military or other security forces) so that only the effects are detectable.
* Anticipate Long-Term Effects. ARSOF must consider the broader political, economic, informational, cultural, demographic, and military effects when faced with dilemmas because the solutions will have broad, far-reaching effects. These forces must accept legal and political constraints to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF must not jeopardize the success of national and GCC long-term objectives with a desire for immediate or short-term effects. Special operations policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with the national and theater of operations priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.
* Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility. Significant legal and policy considerations apply to many special operations activities. Legitimacy and mutual trust are the most crucial factors in developing and maintaining internal and international support. The United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power without legitimacy. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates foster legitimacy, credibility, and trust through decisions and actions that comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, HN laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the ROE. However, the concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict adherence to law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. The people of the nation and the international community determine its legitimacy based on their collective acceptance of its right and authority to govern and exercise power. The perceived legitimacy of its cause and the ethical application of its power, based upon international rules of law, are strong factors in determining political legitimacy. Without legitimacy, credibility, and trust, ARSOF will not receive the support of the indigenous elements that is essential to success.
* Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects. All special operations have significant psychological effects that are often amplified by an increasingly pervasive electronic media environment and the growing influence of social media. Some actions may be conducted specifically to produce a desired behavioral change or response from a selected target audience. Commanders must consider and incorporate the potential psychological effects and impacts of messages and actions into all their activities, anticipating and countering adversary information, as needed, to allow for maximum control of the environment.
* Operate With and Through Others. The primary role of ARSOF in multinational operations is to advise, train, and assist military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of mutual security objectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. ARSOF also operate with and through indigenous government and civil society leaders to shape the operational environment. The long-term self-sufficiency of the foreign forces and entities requires them to assume primary authority and accept responsibility for the success or failure of the mission. All U.S. efforts must reinforce and enhance the capacity, effectiveness, legitimacy, credibility, and trust of the supported foreign government or group.
* Develop Multiple Options. SOF must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. They must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution, or apply two or more simultaneously, to provide flexible national and regional options.
* Ensure Long-Term Engagement. ARSOF must recognize the need for persistence, patience, and continuity of effort. SOF must demonstrate continuity of effort when dealing with political, economic, informational, and military programs. Special operations policy, strategy, and programs must, therefore, be durable, consistent, and sustainable.
Provide Sufficient Intelligence. Success for SOF missions dictates that uncertainty associated with the threat and other aspects of the operational environment must be minimized through the application of intelligence operations and procedures. Because of the needed detailed intelligence, ARSOF typically must also access theater of operations and national intelligence systems to address intelligence shortfalls and to ensure that timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive intelligence is on hand. Human intelligence is often the primary intelligence discipline for satisfying SOF critical intelligence requirements, whether from overt or controlled sources. The key to effective intelligence support is for special operations to fully leverage the entire intelligence support system and architecture. ARSOF units also provide information and intelligence through area assessments, SR, and post-operational debriefing of units.
* Balance Security and Synchronization. Security concerns often dominate special operations, but over-compartmentalization can exclude key special operations forces and conventional forces personnel from the planning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security may compromise a mission; conversely, excessive security may also jeopardize a mission.